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ABSTRACT
In recent years, privacy management has become one of the most complex processes
in the connected world. Fundamental technologies like GPS, cellular communications,
and the Internet have become mandatory equipment in the modern vehicle.
Subsequently, the vehicle became part of this connected world, wherein data are
constantly sent and received. Accordingly, it became inevitable to introduce data
security to vehicular communication. Hence, the development of location based and
other connected services, introduced a new level of data complexity. In scenarios
where GPS data are tied to certain entities or databases consisting of entire personal
profiles, data cannot be treated separately anymore. Prior improvements regarding
privacy protection achieved through anonymous pseudonyms have become negligible,
due to GPS enabled traceability. This paper presents a new approach that turns privacy
protection from a one-way street into a negotiation process. It allows the user to
individually decide what data is provided and what is kept private.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents a privacy management concept that allows for privacy
protection, while incorporating the latest developments in data complexity regarding
vehicular applications. In general, location based services and services that involve
location information, have significantly gained popularity among users and car
manufacturers. The challenge at this point is, whenever general data, such as status
information or location information, is combined with sensitive information like
personal data, this new individual driving data cluster becomes sensitive as well. In
other words, an increase in data complexity also results in an increase in security
complexity (Fiaschetti et al., 2012). In order to protect these clusters, new data
security classes need to be determined based upon the need for physical storage
protection, access control, and required protection level.
In previous work it has been shown that state of the art pseudonymous
communication does not guarantee the required privacy, due to traceability
(Wiedersheim et al., 2010). The purpose of this thesis is to provide an overall data
analysis that allows for data classifications including correlating privacy classes.
These classes shall be defining the basis for an automotive privacy model improving
the flexibility and transparency of data protection based on the IBM-My Privacy
Component Architecture, originally introduced for the Internet by Bohrer et al. in
2001. A live vehicle-data extraction and distribution framework shall be utilized to
identify the relevant data clusters and to evaluate and demonstrate the need for state of
the art security mechanisms to be applied to different automotive use-cases.
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Accordingly, it shall be shown how privacy protection mechanisms vary with the
targeted use-case. Further, the general breakdown of responsibility regarding privacy
protection among the involved developing parties shall be discussed. Additionally an
extract of ongoing privacy debates shall illustrate how current laws, especially in the
U.S., do not provide the necessary legal framework to protect personal data.
In the past the focus of security solutions was related to in-vehicle security
(Schweppe et al., 2012). Most of the data stayed either within the vehicle or were
pulled from an external source (points of interests - POIs) that had no immediate
relation with customers’ driving data. Accordingly, data monitoring was only
necessary one way (intrusion detection). Now that data become steadily more
individual and the back-end communication increases as vehicles become also more
traceable, the protection of the driver’s privacy becomes more complex as well.
Besides traceability, storage protection and access control have become even more
crucial in order to protect each entity within the communication process.
The result of this thesis shall deliver a classification model of the major data
clusters generated from automotive applications and derived data security classes as
described above. These classes shall serve as basis for the introduced privacy concept.
In this chapter, the motivation is to briefly present the work in this thesis,
regarding why pseudonyms do not offer full anonymity, the current privacy laws in
the U.S. are not yet prepared for private data collections, and what general changes in
privacy management are necessary in order to offer more transparency and flexibility
to the customer.
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MOTIVATION

For a lot of inter-vehicle communication (IVC) system services, GPS data
represent a major asset to various functions. Global position data is fundamental for
location based services like recommendations for specific routes (e.g. scenic versus
most direct routes), social events (hotspot identification), requesting the nearest
business or service (e.g. ATM or restaurant), or turn-by-turn navigation to any
address.
It is obvious that IVC systems work with and thereby reveal very detailed
location information patterns about the vehicle. A common and widely accepted
security mechanism is the use of pseudonyms allowing to anonymously authenticating
identities. However, the mapping of any kind of data with very precise GPS data
allows generating a very detailed personal picture of the driver. In General,
Wiedersheim et al. have demonstrated the possibility of reconstructing long traces of a
majority of vehicles within the same area. According to their work it is more than
questionable if location privacy is achievable in IVC systems against a powerful
adversary. Even though actual identities are replaced by pseudonyms and those also
change over time, once a target is identified based on its location every vehicle can be
tracked. The attempt to change the location data density has not yielded the desired
results due to standardization constraints (for more details see Chapter 8).
Another recent approach regarding privacy protection was cutting out any kind
personal data and thereby reducing the information exchange to simple quantity
statements. One example is the private identification of location hotspots introduced
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by Raghunathan et al. The protocol provides an anonymous voting mechanism that
detects location hotspots, while not revealing anything about the voting participants. It
defines optimal privacy protection.
In contrast, services like online diagnosis, route recommendations or charging
recommendations for electric vehicles require much more detailed data to be
exchanged. In other words, in order to make use of these services at some point, data
needs to be exposed. The popularity of mobile application has revealed that users are
willing to provide certain data in order to make use of the various data services. As
already mentioned in the introduction, one goal of this thesis is to provide a more
flexible and also more transparent concept for privacy protection. The key to widely
accepted services is transparency. As an example, the majority of smart phone users
nowadays receive notifications when applications request access to certain kinds of
data. The same transparent application profile management that integrates the user’s
decision can easily be applied to the automotive environment. This thesis will discuss
both mentioned data concepts regarding privacy protection and usability.
The ubiquitous topic of privacy protection has led to major discussions among
governmental parties, influential companies, and independent privacy authorities.
Answering the question of how to protect private data appropriately has now been
discussed for decades. It appears to be that the European Union has taken the leading
role in these controversial debates, whereas the United States only started very
recently to pay attention to privacy concerns. The latest privacy discussion among the
authorities involves the integration of a communication device, also known as “black
box” (as it exists in planes; Lowy, J., 2012). According to a governmental decision,
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the device will be integrated into every new manufactured vehicle, for safety reasons.
Privacy authorities claim that there exist no rules or policies that define limitations to
the data collection enabled through this device. These conditions demand immediate
action in order to protect privacy, this thesis will incorporate the following two
privacy protection aspects. The first is to define specific privacy requirements based
on the already mentioned hotspot detection protocol that provides optimal privacy
protection and shall therefore be used a guideline. Second, the privacy protection
directive given by the European Union is a worldwide-accepted directive and shall
serve in this thesis as privacy protection policy standard.

CONTRIBUTIONS AND FINDINGS

This thesis has implemented a live vehicle-data extraction and distribution
framework. So far, data extraction has been available in many ways for in-vehicle data
that is intended to be further processed on a back-end server. The current sensor data
of a vehicle is mostly exchanged among the various electronic control units (ECUs)
that communicate over the main in-vehicle network, the controller area network
(CAN) bus (ISO 15765-2, 2004). Alternatively, greater amounts of data can be sent to
a server that runs more complex data processing algorithms. These algorithms can
either be used for internal purposes or to offer specific services like, for example route
recommendations based on the driving style and vehicle model. The framework
presented in this thesis provides a flexible subscription to all the available data (i.e.
mostly CAN data) that can be used in various data services. Every service can decide
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individually, through specific subscriptions, instead of simply tapping into a bus
network that is flooded with all the available data. Additionally, the communication
between the vehicle and the back-end is established over a wireless connection, which
allows for even more flexibility. The communication build into the vehicle also
incorporates GPS data, which is needed for the recommendation of charging-friendly,
fun or scenic routes close to the customer.
As already mentioned, whenever GPS data is involved, privacy becomes a major
concern. One of the latest privacy protecting approaches focuses on the exchange of
less data by cutting out any kind personal data. This concept provides clearly optimal
privacy protection but significantly decreases the service opportunities. This thesis
presents a privacy concept that adapts the needs the of detailed data services, while
applying similar privacy requirements presented in the previous approach, but also
allows for more flexibility. Besides state of the art security mechanisms are protecting
the general communication, a transparent application profile management shall be
integrated. This profile is inspired by the IBM My Privacy Component Architecture. It
provides several primary components based on the IBM’s Enterprise Privacy
Architecture (EPA) handling privacy concerns originally intended for the Internet.
This thesis shows that this concept can easily be integrated into the automotive
environment, with requirements derived from the “Golden Rules”. The Golden Rules
are part of the German Federal Data Protection Act, the so called “Golden Rules.”
These Golden Rules are also mounted into the British and most other European
country’s federal laws. The act focuses on the protection against misuse of personal
data in terms of data processing (BDGS, 1994, also see Chapter 2 and 6). The profile
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management shall improve privacy protection, by allowing the vehicle client to
decide, what data shall be available for subscription.
Both the framework and the privacy concept have been evaluated. Test cases for
the framework have been defined based on standard black-box and white-box tests,
looking at inputs and outputs, and whether the internal data processing operates as
required. The state of the art privacy mechanisms applied in the guiding hotspot
identification concept and the newly defined live vehicle-data extraction and
distribution concept have been validated through mathematical proof of concept.
Additionally the privacy concepts discussed, have been validated against the privacy
requirements stated by the Golden Rules.
As a basis for the privacy profile management, this thesis gives an overview of
the various automotive applications and assigns data security classes derived from the
IBM concept and translated into the automotive context.
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OUTLINE DESCRIPTION
The structure of this thesis is divided into nine fundamental parts:

Chapter two gives an overview of current data applications and available privacy
policies and security mechanisms
Chapter three introduces the use-case definition, and the live vehicle-data extraction
and distribution framework
Chapter four describes a conceptual integration of the created privacy concept
Chapter five gives an overview of the framework implementation
Chapter six provides the experimental setup to evaluate the introduced framework
and the related privacy concept
Chapter seven presents the evaluation results of experimental setups
Chapter eight gives an overview on related work including common data application
implementations, privacy concepts and current legal cases concerning privacy
Chapter nine gives an overall conclusion summarizing the work and findings of this
thesis
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CHAPTER 2 – PRIVACY AND ITS MANAGEMENT FOR CONNECTED
VEHICLES

This section will introduce the most common vehicle-to-x and other connected
user applications. In a second step, the available applications shall be summarized data
categories. Eventually, state of the art privacy protection policies and mechanisms
shall be presented.

AUTOMOTIVE COMMUNICATIONS

Automotive Telematics
The fundamental technologies for automotive implementations were first aligned
in the 1990s with GPS, cell phone technology and the Internet (Cordis, 2013).
The most precise definition of telematics is, “a wireless communication system
designed for the collection and dissemination of information that particularly refers to
vehicle-based electronic systems; vehicle tracking and positioning; online navigation;
and information systems and emergency assistance” (Tutorials point, 2013).
The telematics system is implemented into the vehicle as the telematics
communications unit (TCU) that communicates wireless with a central service center.
The TCU functions as a central platform of the vehicle telematics system that
incorporates all telematics-associated technologies. It provides location-specific
information to a central service center, whereas the center helps to deliver telematics
services to a vehicle via cellular phone. Further, the TCU is linked to the engine
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control unit (ECU) allowing for enhanced services i.e. remote engine diagnostics and
automatic airbag notification. A very common application that has been integrated into
the vehicle for years is related to a system called “black-box” (as it exists in planes;
Lowy, J., 2012). Before signals are transmitted as wireless signals they will be
collected through this module, which is placed behind the dashboard. It integrates a
phone, GPS receiver, digital signal processor and microphone for voice recognition.
Additionally it incorporates the vehicle’s data bus to collect diagnostic information
from the available sensors. On the other side, the so called back-end server functions
like an Internet server, i.e. handling applications (analyzing diagnosis data)
(Electronics-TCU, 2013). Other current and future telematics applications are listed
below (Tab.1).

Table 1: Telematics data application overview

Application

Description

Navigation services (POIs)

Provides extended navigation services

Web radio

Provides access to online radio

Wi-Fi hotspots

Provides Internet hotspot functionalities

Traveling information,

Provides specific information about the area

Weather

Provides weather forecasts and related information

Nearest gas/charging station

Provides closest gas/charging station near your current
location

Emergency assistance

Allows for emergency calls from the vehicle, providing
position and other information
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Recommendation engines

Provides different recommendations according to
different behaviors

Online diagnosis

Provides immediate simple maintenance, and sets up
needed appointments

Pay-for-use Insurance

Provides an insurance rate that is based on the driving
behavior

Black box systems

Provides crash monitoring (officially from Sep. 1st
2014)

Back2car

Provides vehicle fleet management and extended
connected services

Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) Communications
Vehicle-to-infrastructure communications enable data transmissions from the
roadside to the vehicle in order to alert drivers that e.g. it is not safe to enter a certain
intersection. Data can be exchanged by using vehicles as data collectors, to
anonymously transmit traffic and road condition data from all main roads of the
transportation network. These data help to provide transportation agencies with the
knowledge that is needed to implement dynamic plans allowing for reduced traffic
congestions. One well-known application in vehicle-to-infrastructure communication
is the electronic toll collection system. It is present in many countries and therefore
somewhat advanced in terms of deployment. As already mentioned, other applications
that shall enable the reduction of vehicular accidents, traffic congestions,
transportation time, fuel consumption and environmental impact of road transport,
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define the fundamental research areas (Holfelder et al., 2004; Jansons et al., 2012,
National VII Coalition, 2013).An overview of current and future V2I applications is
given below (Tab.2).
Table 2: Vehicle-to-infrastructure data applications overview

Application

Description

Wireless payment or toll systems

Provides wireless payment systems at toll stations,
(gas stations and parking garages)

Real time traffic information

Provides real time traffic within the network

Traffic light assistant

Provides congestions control through the
distribution of traffic light timings

Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Communications
For many years now, vehicle-to-vehicle communication has been addressed by
automotive and non-automotive research organizations. The most common use cases
include numerous infotainment applications i.e. ad-hoc networking for information
exchange, chat applications or gaming, but also advanced active safety applications
i.e. inter-vehicle hazard warning or spectrum intersection collision avoidance systems.
Until today, not any of those applications have moved to production due to technical
and non-technical i.e. business related issues (Holfelder et al., 2004). An overview of
current and future V2V applications is given below (Tab.3).
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Table 3: Vehicle-to-vehicle data applications overview

Application

Description

Accident reporting

Provides accident report distribution

Warnings (entering intersections,

Provides context-based warnings

departing highways, sudden halts,
lane change)
Adaptive cruise control (ACC)

Provides automatic vehicle speed adjustments

Social Media Communication
According to current development trends, social platforms like Facebook and
other social applications like Twitter are planned to be integrated into the modern
vehicle’s infotainment system (Tab.4).
Table 4: Social data applications overview

Application

Description

Facebook

Provides access to friends activities

Twitter

Provides access to friends activities and news

Automotive application data categories
The table below (Tab.5) shows the prior introduced data applications grouped in
three data categories as a basis for the later evaluation that shall result in the required
data security classes.
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Table 5: Application data categories

Application

Time/location

Broadcasted data, or

based data

independent data

Wireless payment

real time traffic

Traffic light assistant

or toll systems

information

Identifiable data
type
V2I

V2V

Accident

Warnings (entering

reporting

intersections, departing
highways, sudden halts,
lane change)
Adaptive cruise control
(ACC)

Telematics

Online diagnosis

Navigation

Web radio

services (POIs)
Wi-Fi hotspots

Traveling

Pay-for-use

information,

Insurance

Weather

Emergency

Nearest

assistance

gas/charging

Online news

station
Black box systems

Back2car

(crash monitoring –
Sep. 1st 2014)
Social Media

Facebook

newsfeeds, twitter
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PRIVACY PROTECTION POLOCIES

This section will introduce the term privacy protection and provide the
background of common protection policies that are mostly addressed by the European
and in some cases by the U.S. law.

Privacy definitions
The general definition of privacy describes “The state or condition of being free
from being observed or disturbed by other people” (Oxford, 2013).In particular data
privacy can be defined as “The relationship between collection and dissemination of
data ...” (Ethics point, 2013). Further privacy concerns “…exist wherever personally
identifiable information is collected and stored – in digital form or otherwise” (Ethics
point, 2013). A trivial form of personally identifiable information in the automotive
context can be vehicle identification numbers (VINs), or more complex, location
information (GPS information) allowing for traceability and making IDs negligible
(see Chapter 8).
In the following section discusses the contrast between European and U.S.
regarding privacy protection.

U.S. vs. European governmental privacy policies

A fundamental difference between the two legislations represents the treatment of
sensitive personal data. In its basis the U.S. law does not provide one comprehensive
statute conducting data protection or privacy issues but has a number of laws and
15

executive orders instead. It’s mainly the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Computer
Matching and Privacy Act offering laws that solely deal with personal data held by the
federal government but however have no authority over the collection and use of
personal data held by non-government parties. Further, the Computer matching and
Privacy Protection Act adds regulations controlling the usage of computer matching.
The term matching in this context refers to computerized comparison of individual
data that shall determine the eligibility for Federal benefit programs (e.g. recouping
payments, delinquent debts).Additionally the Computer Security Act assures the
security of personally identifiable data in federal computer systems. Supplementary,
there have been laws created by the U.S. legislation that are in a wider context related
to privacy and data protection. They cover aspects like prohibiting the use of
personally identifiable data from the census, protecting against disclosure of personal
data gathered by the National Centers for Health Service and Research, revising the
confidentiality and dissemination practices, making tax return information confidential
and eventually having criminal penalties for illegal disclosures. A second type of law
creating in the U.S. can be described as a responsive approach. It is that laws are
created in reaction to observed abuses. One response was a restriction for the federal
government to access records held by other sources. Until the era of the Internet,
misuse of personal data held by public or private entities was not conceived by
policymakers as a threat to privacy or personal liberty (Stratford et al., 1998).
In the starting process of adapting to the connected digital world, the European
Union (EU) has had a predominant role regarding international decisions on information
privacy. The dominance of the EU has been strengthened by the authority of EU Member
Nations, as they coherently block data transfers from their country to third party nations
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(EPCD, 1995).The term “third party countries” is also referring to such nations as the
U.S., which according to the EU is missing “adequate” privacy protections ( Hustinx,

1999). The sectoral privacy law in the U.S. divides the responsibilities for public and
private data categories. As a consequence, in case data cannot be assigned to any of the
available categories, they might not be protected at all (Solove et al., 2011).

Over the years the U.S. sector-by-sector approach stands still in contrast to the
EU’s so called omnibus legislation, which treats personal data regardless whether they
are private or public sector related. The global reaction prooves the EU as highly
influential, whereas the U.S. appears to be an outlier regarding data protection. The
EU Data Protection Directive established mutual rules for data privacy among its
member states and set a three year deadline to adopt compliant legislation (Regan,
1995).
Eventually the U.S. law understood the importance of privacy protection and enacted
data protection laws. Further the Commerce Department of the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) is now a full member of EU privacy conferences (Bamberger et al.,
2011).
Due to the still existing EU supremacy regarding data protection legislation, the
protection measures in this thesis shall be based on the European standards, briefly
introduced in the next section.
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Golden Rules
The so called “Golden rules” (listed in Chapter 6) are mounted into the German,
British and most other European countries federal laws (HM Government, 2008). The
act focuses on the protection against misuse of personal data in terms of data
processing. The definition can e.g. be found as an annex to section 9 in the German
“Federal Data Protection Act”, which is related to technical and organizational
measures and therefore fundamental policy for big companies like Volkswagen
dealing with various amounts of data.
Later on these rules shall be used as state of the art privacy policies in order to
evaluate the presented privacy concepts.
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GENERAL DATA AND IT-SECURITY MECHANISMS

This section will introduce standard and to a greater extend later applied data and
IT-security mechanisms.

Certificates
Digital Certificates
Digital certificates supplement electronic messages with the purpose of providing
authentication measures. The term authentication refers to the procedure that a
receiver of a message is able to verify that the sender is the true sender. In order to
send an encrypted message, an entity needs to apply for a digital certificate from a
Certificate Authority (CA). The CA issues an encrypted digital certificate consisting
of a public key and various identification data. For protocol reasons the CA’s own
public key is made available to the public via e.g. the Internet (Fig.1).

Unsigned certificate:



Hash of unsigned
certificate

User data
User’s public key

H



CA’s
private key

E

Signed certificate:


Message digest

Recipient can
verify signature
Using CA’s public
key

Signature
CA
Figure 1: Digital signing (Code.google, 2013)
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Now the recipient of the encrypted message makes use of the CA's public key in
terms of decoding the digital certificate tied to the message. This action verifies that
the certificate has been issued by the CA and also allows the receiver to obtain the
sender's public key and identification data included in the certificate (Fig.2).
Signed certificate:



CA’s
public key

D

Recipient can verify signature
Using CA’s public key

H

Hash of unsigned
certificate

If equal the signature is valid
Figure 2: Digital verification (Code.google, 2013)

Based on this new knowledge the receiver is now able to send an encrypted
response. The most commonly applied standard for digital certificates is X.509.
Version 1 was introduced in 1988 integrated into the International Telecommunication
Unit (ITU) X.500 Directory Services standard. Since then, two more revisions of the
standard have been published including additional fields supporting directory access
control, extensions for additional data regarding the certificate holder and the
certificate usage. The main parameters of a certificate are listed in the following
(Tab.6).
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Table 6: Certificate parameters (RFC 5280, 2013)

Name
Serial Number
Signature
Issuer

Content
Integer
Algorithm Identifier, Value: bit string
Name

Validity

Not Before Time, Not After Time

Subject

Name

Subject Public Key Info
Version
Time

Algorithm Identifier, Value: bit string
Integer {v1(0), v2(1), v3(2)}
UTC Time, General Time

Unique Identifier

Bit string

Standard Attributes

Country
Organization
Locality
Title
Name
Pseudonym

In general, the term X.509 denotes the latest, Version 3, unless the version
number is specified differently (RFC 4158; 5280, 2013).
Certification Authority – CA infrastructure
The management of certificates is one of aspects covered by the commonly
applied WAVE standard (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment) in vehicle-to-x

21

(V2X) communications. The standard comprises information exchange among
vehicles (private and public), confirmation with Certification Authorities (CA), which
includes providing personal data in a wireless environment. Besides the CA the main
parties involved are the car manufacturer (OEM) and the vehicle itself represented by
the hardware security module (Fig.3).
generates
Long-term-key-pair
Unique ID

Car Manufacturer

Long-term-certificate
validates

validates

Certification
Authority
validates

validates

short-term-certificate
Pseudonyms

Hardware Security Module : HSM
short-term-key-pair
generate
s
Figure 3: Certification management

The OEM generates a unique ID (usually the Vehicle Identification Number –
VIN), a long term public-key pair linked to a long-term certificate. The certificate
including the ID and other data shall then be validated by the CA. This process allows
for an authenticated communication among the different entities. As a part of the invehicle communication architecture, the hardware security module (HSM) generates
short term key pairs and sends them to the Certification Authority. The CA then
validates them and generates related pseudonyms, both linked to a short term
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certificate. There are different responsibility level for a CA, that is general regional
limitations but also country limitations. In order to prevent identification based on
certificates linked to certain regions or countries a mechanism called crosscertification has been implemented into the standard. In order to initiate the cross
certification the vehicle with a certificate from region (A) would first have to
authenticate itself to a CA responsible for region (B) by providing its existing long
term certificate. Once a vehicle crosses the border to the new authority region, a new
short term certificate, with a new set of associated pseudonyms and public key
pairslinked to the new region, will be issued by the new CA. At the point, when the
vehicle returns to its original region, the short-term certificate that was specifically
generated for region B, will be revoked and the responsibility will handed back again
to the original CA. Another important feature of certification revocation is used for
authentication management. Vehicles or other communication participants like road
side units (RSU) functioning as gateways within overall vehicular ad-hoc networks
(VANETs) can be revoked in case of e.g. malicious behavior. The information about
revoked participants is distributed in so called certification revocation lists (CRLs) that
are broadcasted among the participants.
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Cipher methodologies
Symmetric encryption
Symmetric cipher algorithms are based on so-called “secret-keys” shared between
the communicating parties. The term “symmetric” refers to the fact that encryption
and decryption are using the exact same key. The basic principle is illustrated in the
graphic below (Fig.4).
2. Step:
Sender gives separately key
and ciphertext to receiver.
3. Step:
Receiver uses key to
decrypt the ciphertext

1. Step:
Sender selects a
key and encrypts.

plaintext

encryption

decryption
ciphertext

plaintext

Figure 4: Symmetric cipher algorithm (MxRelease, 2013)

Data Encryption Standard (DES) was invented by IBM and the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1976, USA (see INV; FIPS, 1999). It belongs
to the family of block ciphers and uses involution (a function is its own inverse) as
main

function

and

highly

non-linear

function

as

security

mechanism.

Complementarily it uses a key map providing keys for every round of involution. It
takes two 32bit input blocks (L) and (R) as clear text and outputs 64 bit of cryptogram
The key map provides a different key (K) of 48bit length derived from
a 64bit key for up to 16 rounds. The round structure was invented by the IMB engineer
Horst Feistel, who migrated from Germany to the US in 1934. The already mentioned
involution function is a self-inverting function (F) that applied twice compensates
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itself. After all, nobody was able to break the involution mechanism since 1976
(Menezes, 2001).

PLAIN TEXT

L [32bit]

R [32bit]
K [48 bit]

F
XOR
CRYPTOGRAM

f
L’ = L + f(R, K)

R

Y [64 bit]
K [48 bit]

F
XOR

f

PLAIN TEXT L + f(R, K) + f(R, K)

R

Figure 5: Data Encryption Standard (DES) with one key (K) encryption

In case there is more than one key involved a transposition phase will be added
for (N) additional key blocks (Fig.6).

KEY ONE
F

f

TRANSPOSITION PHASE
KEY N
F

f
Figure 6: Data Encryption Standard (DES) with (N) key (K) encryption

An advancement of DES is the so called Triple DES (TDEA). It comprises three
times cascaded DES, with three keys of each 56 bit length. TDEA offers a
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comparatively simple method that increases the key size of DES to protect against
such attacks. It comprises three times cascaded DES, with three keys of each 56 bit
length. Accordingly, there are different keying options, with either all three keys
being independent, only two keys independent, or all keys the same. The more keys
are independent the longer becomes the total key length (FIPS, 2012). The longer the
key length the stronger in fact becomes the cipher but also the computational
complexity.
Asymmetric encryption
Asymmetric cipher algorithms are based on so-called “public-key” protocols. The
term “asymmetric” is related to the fact that the encryption and decryption keys
represent each other’s inverse. Subsequently, when both keys come together they
revoke the cipher and the secured message will appear. The public key of the receiver
shall be used for encryption, whereas the sender’s secret key is used as the signature.
This guarantees that only the intended receiver can open and decrypt the message and
allows the sender to authenticate it. The basic principle is illustrated in the graphic
below (Fig.7).
1. Step: Receiver gives
public key to sender.

2. Step: Sender uses public key to
encrypt the plaintext.

plaintext encryption
3. Step: Sender gives the
ciphered text to receiver.

ciphertext

ciphertext

4. Step: Sender uses private key to
decrypt the ciphertext.

ciphertext decryption

plaintext

Figure 7: Asymmetric cipher algorithm (Data-Processing, 2013)
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Digital Signatures
An additional application of public cipher algorithms besides encryption is to
provide digital signatures as proof of authenticity of a digital message or document
(Rivest et al., 1983). A common signature scheme is the RSA Digital Signature
scheme, which shall be presented in the following reflecting the work of Rivest et al.
In order to have two parties communicating in a secure and authenticated manner,
both need a public key and a public modulo

. The latter shall be based on two secret

preferably high primes generating a multiplicative inverse Groupℤn*.The highest order
and the number of invertible elements in a multiplicative group can be determined
with the Euler Function φ(n), with φ(φ(n)) as the number of units with the highest
order (Delfs et al., 2007). Since RSA operates with exponents there are two related
modulo defined in the scheme. According to Euler’s Totient Theorem, that is
, such that

and

being relatively prime it holds that

modulo of the exponent, with

for

is defined as

being prime (Weisstein, 2013).

The parameter setup for the scheme is defined as follows (Rivest et al., 1983).
Public parameters
1. Public Keys
a. For user A :
b. For User B:
2. Public Modulo
a. For user A:

, defining the modulo for user A

b. For user B:

, defining the modulo for user B

27

Private parameters
1. Private Key user A and B:
2. Secret large prime pairs of user A and B:

and

The protocol comprises the following steps:
1. Step: User A generates cryptogram

2. Step: User A generates signature
modulo

, with

in modulo

, with

, with proving content

and

in

, with

3. Step: User A sends

to user B

4. Step: User B decrypts cryptogram

and verifies

a.
b.
c.

, proves authenticity of the sender

Blind Signature Schemes
The first introduction of blind signature schemes was published by Chaum,
allowing messages signed by a third party without exposing any information about the
message itself (Chaum, 1983, 1985). Blind signatures have various usability including
anonymous access control, and digital cash.
In his work he extended the implementation of RSA signatures (Rivest et al.,
1983) as follows. A client has a message m that needs to be signed by another party
like e.g. a communication server, and the client does not want the server to know
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anything about (m). Let (e, n) be the server’s public key and (d, n) the private key,
with n being the applied arithmetic modulo. The client generates a random unit (r) (an
element that is invertible under multiplication is called unit; Giambruno, 2008).
Another property of (r) is that it satisfies

stating that (r) is relatively

prime to (n). In other words (r) and (n) have no common factor raise the level of
protection (Johnston et al., 2009). The modular multiplicative inverse of (e) or (r) can
be determined based on the Extended Euclidean algorithm (Koshy, 2007). An example
design using the RSA Blind Signature shall give a more detailed insight on how the
defined mechanism is designed (Goldwasser et al., 2008).

1. Step: Server defines public directory and sends it to the client
a. Server defines public directory (e, n), with highly prime (e) as
public key and public modulo

, with p and q highly prime

and
b. Sends public directory to client
2. Step: Client computes blinded message and sends it to the server
a. Client defines message (m) and random unit (r)
b. Client Computes blinded message
c. Sends (BM) to the server
 The server cannot derive any useful information from (BM)
3. Step: Server signs blinded message and sends it back to the client
a. Signs the blinded message by computing
and sends it back to the client
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4. Step: Client extracts signed message
a. Client Computes

, with
, that is

by the server signed message (m) with private key (d)
b. Obtains the true blind signature (BS) of (m)
The security of this signature scheme is implicit with the standard security
argument that factoring and root extraction remains computationally infeasible
(Gregg, J. A. et al., 2003). In general the signature scheme is unconditionally “blind”
since (r) is chosen randomly and therefore does not allow the signer (here: the server)
to learn about the message even if just mentioned computational infeasible problems
can be solved.
Commitment Schemes
A commitment scheme describes a secret agreement or exchange of knowledge
about certain information or message (Pedersen, 1991). In this thesis, the common
Chaum-Pedersen commitment scheme will be applied and described in following. The
message commitment scheme comprises two steps, the commitment and the opening
MC = (Commit, Open). The commitment executes (c,sk) ← Commit(m,r), whereas the
input message (m) and randomness (r) generate a commitment (c) to message (m) and
secret key that is necessary to open the commitment. In the subsequent opening step
the client executes (m,r) ← Open(c,sk), whereas the inputs here commitment (c) and
secret key (sk) generate the output message m and randomness (r) applied in the
commitment.
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Properties of a secure bit commitment scheme:
1. hiding: no knowledge about the message m is exposed
2. binding: committing to c and generating an opening (m’, r’) with m’≠ m is
infeasible ((c) binds the client to message (m))
In other words, the commitment is hiding based on the fact that
uniformly over Group

and therefore hides

is distributed

within the commitment

.

The binding property is infeasible to break based on the assumption that the discrete
logarithm over

for a polynomial-time adversary is infeasible (Harn, L., 1994).

An example design using the Chaum-Pedersen Commitment shall give a more
detailed insight on how the defined mechanism is designed (Chaum et al., 1992).
System setup: The receiver chooses:
1. Group

of prime order p (so the discrete logarithm is hard to solve)

2. Generator g of order-q subgroup of ℤP*
3. Secret (a)
4. Scheme Parameter
5. Commitment scheme
The sender chooses a particular message m ∈ ℤP and a random factor (r).
1. Step: (c,sk) ← Commit(m,r)
a. Server defines public directory p, g,
with (a) private
b. Sends public directory to client
c. Client computes commitment c’
d. Client sends (c’, m, r) to server

31

,

2. Step: (m,r) ← Open(c,sk)
a. Server computes (c), with (h, g, m, r)
b. Server verifies commitment with computed (c) and received (c’),
that is
Zero Knowledge Proofs
So called Zero-Knowledge-Proofs-of-Knowledge (ZKPoK) were invented by
Goldwasser, Micali and Racko in 1982 (Goldreich, 2002). The general approach of
mathematical proofs is to provide all the necessary facts in order to prove that a
statement is true. In contrast a ZKPoK does not reveal any facts. Zero-Knowledge
Proofs (ZKPs) allow having another party prove that a statement is true. The other
party will be completely convinced about the truth of the statement, but will not learn
anything about it. In other words, the other party will gain zero knowledge (Barak,
2010). In this thesis, the Schnorr’s ZKP will be applied suggesting a proof of
knowledge for the discrete logarithm, which will be explained in the following.
Recollecting the setup from the previous parameters:
Commitment parameters
o

Multiplicative group: ℤ , with

o

Message:

o

Commitment:

o

Randomness:

o

Secret key:

o

Generator:

o

Public parameter:

32

being prime

Proof parameters:
o

Additional randomness:

Identification protocol:

1. Step: Client computes
a.

b.
c. Sends

to server

2. Step: Server chooses random
a. With
b. Sends

from ℤ
to client

3. Step: Client computes
a.

with

b.
c. Sends

to server

4. Step: Server verifies
a.
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CHAPTER 3 – VEHICLE DATA EXTRACTION AND DISTRIBUTION
FRAMEWORK

INTRODUCING THE FRAMEWORK

With respect to recent developments within the automotive industry, reliable
range estimation for electric vehicles (EVs) has become a crucial feature when it
comes to investing in this new technology. Online diagnosis would be based on the
transfer of diagnostic data from the vehicle to the backend for immediate
interpretation.
A more general approach is to combine various kinds of vehicle-data with GPS
tags enabling completely new algorithmic opportunities. In this context, one goal of
this architecture is to make the required vehicle-data (e.g., energy consumptions,
current speed, and diagnosis data) available on backend for further processing.
Future developments could go into customized route recommendations with
topics like navigated guidance in terms of route recommendations titled with e.g.
“Scenic” vs. “Sport” routes. This approach will depend on existing driving style data
combined with car model information and other useful criteria like the already
mentioned GPS data.
The attempt of this first application concept is to construct an architecture that is
able to collect live-data from on-board units inside the vehicle and send them back to
the backend for further processing. Overall the approach of this service follows the
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characteristics of connected applications that are making local data globally
accessible. Further details on the data processing will be discussed in the section.
DATA PROCESSING

The data processing concept essentially comprises of four different phases, data
extraction, data collection, data publishing and subscription (Fig.8).

Figure 8: Data processing

The data extraction determines the relevant BUS data from inside the vehicle.
This includes the generation of update packages and sending them to the backend. The
data collection represents the extraction and processing of all the data belonging to one
update package in order to make them available for an another independent
application.
In the final step, the aforementioned independent application will be able to
access the forwarded vehicle data by subscribing to context relevant data. The data
packages consist of status information and currently measured values.

35

In general there are two approaches when it comes to connected applications
which are related to either increasing or decreasing the data complexity. In the
following sections both approaches will be specified with concrete use-cases.

POSSIBLE CONCEPT ALTERATIONS

This first approach represents an increased complexity level. It can result in
applying complex data mining algorithms allowing for substantial long term
statements. Regarding the attempt of achieving a more accurate and reliable range
estimation it has been shown that an increase in data amounts can bring significant
improvements (Ferreira, J.C. et al.). On the downside, data mining leads to various
privacy issues and most attempts so far have used obscurity as a security mechanism.
This reduces the probability of identifying a particular individual but still doesn’t
protect it appropriately (Cynthia Dworket al., 2010; Clifton, C., 2007).
Two alterations of the main concepts (profile generation and diagnosis
statements) follow Each will be explained in their functionalities and privacy
requirements.
One potential concept alteration could be the generation of driver profiles as an
example for an increased data complexity. As already discussed, collecting data from
the vehicle combined with certain logic and/or GPS data allows for various amounts of
services, often referred to as connected services. For example, driving style matched
with the car model can allow for route recommendations provided to the customer
(Fig.9). Alternatively, it can help car manufacturers to improve their marketing
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strategies by creating new vehicle configuration packages specifically for the
discovered customer requirements. Considering electric vehicles, energy consumption
over time enables analysis potential of the vehicle’s charging behavior based on the
driven routes. This way the customers can adjust their driving behavior to optimize
their charging strategy. All these various statements shall be then integrated in the
customer’s personal profile.

Figure 9: Protocol data processing concept

Another alteration can be to provide complex diagnosis statements to clients.
They shall either provide immediate online maintenance (software updates, timing
optimizations). In case of more complex diagnosis results, an automated appointment
shall be made, based on information like vehicle type, driven miles, the actual
diagnosis statement.
SERVER

CLIENTS

Figure 10: Protocol architecture
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SERVICE

DISTRIBUTIO
N

RESULT

PROCESSING

RAW DATA

SERVICE STATEMENTS

One can tell from the graphic above (Fig.10) that although the concepts have
different applications, the overall communication architecture is quite similar.
Accordingly, the next section will present a privacy management approach that shall
be representative for the main and its related concepts.
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CHAPTER 4 – PRIVACY PROTECTION INTEGRATION

HOW PRIVACY PROTECTION MECHANISMS VARY WITH THE
APPLICATION

As a descriptive entry, it is helpful to briefly recollect the biggest challenges with
connected applications these days. Data collections have become goldmines for a lot
of different business models, e.g. customer profiles, long-term or historic data used by
so called data mining companies for further analysis. Positive results for the end
customer shall be more personalized services. The down-side of this well-intended
approach, besides money, is that the traded good is personal and sometimes very
private information (Fischermannet al., 2013; Facebook RepPortal, 2012, IMFSurvey
Magazine, 2012).
One of the biggest wins from the connected world is the opportunity of nearly
unlimited exchange of information (IMFSurvey Magazine, 2012) which in turn leads
to the attempt of this use-case: achieving privacy protection while still being
connected. In other words, the goal is to offer similar or even the same benefits to the
customer but without exposing any sensitive, private or personal information.
In the process of finding solutions protecting personal data while staying
connected this use-case and its presented alterations will show-case what data privacy
requirements are necessary and where protection constraints begin. It has been shown
that increasing data protection is not sufficient through merely making storage more
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secure or enhancing access controls in order to solve all privacy concerns, due to the
human factor (NYMITY, 2012).
The main goal with the presented framework is to make existing local data
globally available. In the next step privacy concerns shall be addressed through the
definition of privacy requirements.

PRIVACY PROTECTION CONCEPT FOR THE PRESETNED FRAMEWORK

The privacy concept discussed in this section shall be designed from the customer
or client perspective. Since every service is based up on data that can be related to a
private individual, it is important to protect it.

In the following, the necessary privacy requirements and its related mechanisms
will be discussed for the “Live vehicle data extraction and distribution” concept.
Privacy requirements from the client perspective:
1. The client needs to give permission to share the data that is being
processed by the available services
2. The raw data linked to the ID and location data must be protected
3. The processed plain text must not be accessible for unauthorized
personnel
4. Optional. Additional trust bound between client and automotive company
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Accordingly to the concept’s requirements respective privacy protection
mechanisms shall be explained and illustrated in example designs.
Requirement one can be satisfied with the following mechanism. This mechanism
is fundamental for every system that claims to protect privacy. The setup of a privacy
profile based on personal preferences and general policies given by the law should
allow the client to manage what data are made available to the various service
applications and which is kept private. IBM published on the fourth International
Conference on Electronic Commerce Research (Bohrer, 2001) a technical approach
for personal information and distribution. The communication matches is based on
XML standards which matches perfectly with the automotive environment standards.
Most telematics applications deal with the collection of information (in-vehicle
measurements and status signals) that are usually streamed to the backend server in
XML format (ASA, 2008; Telematics Update, 2013). Additionally, those data are
mapped with very precise GPS data generating a very detailed personal picture of the
driver. The necessity of these applications is often claimed by insurance companies
since they can profit from the generated knowledge (ASA, 2008; Cognizant, 2012). It
is obvious that there are cases (e.g. emergency cases) where GPS data can be very
helpful in sending out assistance to a location provided by the individual in need. On
the contrary, in a lot of other cases these GPS links may be utilized inappropriately by
tracking individuals (ASA, 2008).
The IBM Privacy Services (IPS) system therefore provides several primary
components based on IBM’s Enterprise Privacy Architecture (EPA), handling privacy
concerns for automotive telematics applications. The system includes automatic and
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manual authorization for release of private data, matching the individual’s and general
law related privacy policies with those of data-requesters/application (see Chapter 8
for details).
The following negotiation example is based on a dealer profile following the
concept given by Bohrer et al. but translated into the automotive context.

1. A customer sets up an online appointment with a dealer for new car. He adds
the note that he also wants to sell his old car.
2. The dealer receives the appointment request and asks in return for the name,
address, salary and assets along with the privacy policy that the data will be
used to approve credit. Additionally data about the old car will be requested
like i.e. car make, mileage and year along with the privacy policy that these
data will be used to determine the value of the old car.
3. The profile denies the first part of the request and offers to send an alias profile
including salary and an asset range. On the other hand the request about the
vehicle data will be accepted.
4. The dealer will accept the data but indicates that subsequently a final credit
approval is not possible but only an analysis for a possible credit.
5. The customer sends the data for the credit analysis only as well as the vehicle
data to determine the value of the old car.

Once the client has defined certain policies which shall be accompanied by
common privacy laws, only authentic data requests that fulfill these policies shall be
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permitted to the server (service provider).The authentication of the service request is
based on two aspects, whether the requester is listed within the individual’s privacy
profile and whether the requester has the permission to view the data like e.g. sensor
data. As another privacy protection mechanism, the possibility of “data mashup”,
autonomous data collection and integration through communicating applications must
be prohibited (Soylu et al., 2012). Another more general goal of this approach is to
build up trust between the client and the service application. Transparency in this
context shall be utilized to establish this fundamental trust helping the client to
understand what data are requested and what the purpose of this request is.
Essential for this approach is a classification of data in order to define handling
rules respectively. Hence, a data classification shall be the result of this thesis
evaluation.
Requirement two can be satisfied with the following mechanism. It needs to
guarantee that all data linking to personal information, like IDs or location information
will be protected. This kind of data, according to the main concept and its alterations,
can be determined as the live data that is extracted from the vehicle’s internal
communication. In order to protect it, a secure communication path between the
vehicle, the server and a secure storage needs to be established. Protecting the
communication path shall prevent public attacks and the secure storage shall reduce
the human factor by limiting the accessibility inside the company’s backend.
The protection of the communication path can be achieved with either symmetric
or asymmetric ciphers. In order to maintain the performance of the system, the
symmetric approach shall be preferred at this point. A well-known cipher algorithm is
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the Data Encryption Standard (DES, see Chapter 2). The initial DES cipher's key
length of 56 bits was sufficient was sufficient in most cases, but due to increasing
computational power, brute-force attacks had become feasible. Triple DES (TDEA)
offers a comparatively simple method that increases the key size of DES to protect
against such attacks. Since TDEA is mostly based on the DES algorithm, in the
following an overview of the DES block cipher protocol shall be provided.
Upfront server and client need agree on a secret function (f) and secret keys (Ki).
According to the protocol (L) and (R) and comprise a data block of 64 bit in total split
up in 32 bit each. In the following a simplified example design will be presented
showing the functionality of the algorithm.
1. Step: Agreement
a. Server and client agree on:
, with f extracting the
with

LSB of the actual result,

representing an XOR operation,

and
2. Step: Client encrypts data block:

and sends it to the server

a. Client assigns data blocks,
with
b. Round 1: Computes

,

with
extracting 4 LSBs →

c. Transposition:

,

44

and
d. Round 2: Computes

extracting 4 LSBs →

e. Transposition:

,

and
f. Sends cryptogram

to server

Once the server receives the cryptogram it can be stored in the database and
linked to e.g. a unique session ID for internal traceability but associated with a flexible
expiration date. After the session expires the ID as well as the data shall be deleted. In
order to accomplish the following steps, it is important that the processing of the
decrypted data follows the policies determined by the Golden Rules (see Chapter 2
and 6).
3. Step: Server decrypts data block
a. Transposition:
and
b. Server assigns data blocks,
with
c. Round 1: Computes

,

with
extracting 4 LSBs →
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d. Transposition:
and
e. Round 2: Computes

extracting 4 LSBs →

f. Receives data block
What this means for the prior defined architecture is a security extension for parts
of the components (Fig.11).
SERVER

CLIENTS

ESK(D)

SERVICE

SK

DISTRIBUTION

SK

DSK(D)

RESULT

ESK(D)

PROCESSING

SK

RAW DATA (D)
D

PROFILE

PLAIN TEXT

SERVICE STATEMENTS
Figure 11: Privacy enhanced framework

Data are now communicated and stored encrypted according to the agreed secret
key algorithm (secret key (SK), encrypted data ESK(D)). Only requested processing
data will be decrypted DSK(D) and made available as plain text. The secret key shall be
only known by the automotive company and the protected onboard unit of the vehicle.
Every vehicle’s onboard unit is now equipped with a personal privacy profile such that
only permitted data leaves the individual’s vehicle. One part of the in Chapter 2
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mentioned Golden Rules dealing with data protection is covered by the introduced
mechanisms. It is assumed that the respective car manufacturer (OEM – Original
Equipment Owner) has an established firewall system and secured data storage and
therefore will be not part of this concept.
The plain text processing section of this concept (Fig.11) asks for access control
policies mainly addressed by the Golden Rules and therefore already common
knowledge in every automotive company’s IT infrastructure. The assessment of these
policies will be covered within evaluation later on in this thesis.
The optional trust bound between client and automotive company will only be
mentioned but not integrated into the concept since the required mechanisms are not
immediate privacy protecting mechanisms. In some cases trust mechanisms are even
counterintuitive. They often expose additional personal data in order to identify the
communicating parties or simply increase the overhead while the added value is
questionable. A trust enhancing mechanism from the OEM perspective can be Digital
Signatures that besides the actual encrypted message sends a signed piece of
information or the actual message (the already encrypted message) that shall validate
the party’s identity. A signature is defined as the public of public key protocol like e.g.
RSA (see Chapter 2). This will increase the overhead but in a manageable way, since
the computational power is needed to verify a signature, which is fairly simple to do
with the computational power on the backend side.
In order to enhance the trust between both parties, the usage of certificates
(Chapter 2) allows authenticating the identity in both ways but also brings more
computational overhead on both sides. It is important to mention though that in order

47

to keep privacy protected, only make use of pseudonymous public key certificates as
they do not contain any identifiable information. Consequently they cannot be used to
link to a specific client or to another pseudonymous certificate. Since trust
enhancements are necessary, but not immediate privacy protection mechanisms rather
than security mechanisms, they were not considered as a part of the concept.
Now that data are available as clear text, defined processing algorithms shall
transform the extracted vehicle data into applicable statements that in turn shall be
made available for the provided connected services. These services as a final step shall
provide valuable recommendations or suggestions to the client.
In the following, two possible approaches for a communication initiation and
profile setups are described. The communication itself shall be based on unique
expiring session ID and can be distinguished as active and passive from the client
perspective.

Active communication initiation:
1. Client onboard unit sends service request
2. Onboard unit checks with privacy profile for permission
3. Onboard unit sends permitted data to server
4. Server computes valuable statements
5. Service extracts statements and forms results
6. Service sends results back to client as recommendation or suggestion
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Passive communication initiation:
1. Client onboard unit detects anomaly in diagnosis data
2. Onboard unit checks with privacy profile for permission
3. Based on profile settings
a. Onboard unit sends diagnosis data to server
b. Onboard unit informs client with in-car signal about necessary
service
4. In case of a) server interprets diagnosis data extended services offers back
to the client (e.g. service appointment data according to the diagnosis or
applies immediate software correction if possible)
The profile setups below (Tab. 7) illustrate how the client can decide, what data
shall be made available to a specific service for subscription. As an example, a service
like a travel guide shall be made available based on several levels of exposed personal
related data. The chosen data in this example are destination location, current
location and driving style. Driving style hereby can represent slow/fast drivers, driving
with adaptive cruise control (ACC), etc.
Table 7: Profile variations for a travel guide service

Profile 1
Allow
Deny
subscription
to chosen
destination
locations
subscription
to current
location
subscription
to driving
style

Service List 1
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Destination information
o Weather
o Current events
o Extended sight information

Profile 2
Allow
Deny
subscription
to chosen
destination
locations
subscription
to current
location
subscription
to driving
style
Profile 3
Allow
Deny
subscription
to chosen
destination
locations
subscription
to current
location
subscription
to driving
style

Service List 2




Destination information
o Weather
o Current events
o Extended sight information
General route recommendation
o Scenic routes
o Charging/refuel
recommendations

Service List 2






Destination information
o Weather
o Current events
o Extended sight information
General route recommendation
o Scenic routes
o Charging/refuel
recommendations
Customized routes
o Relaxed routes
o Sport, curvy routes

There are two important aspects to be noted at this point. On the one hand, the
various profile setups shall demonstrate flexibility regarding the exposed data, based
on the client’s decision. On the other hand, it shows the subsequent service limitations
according to the client’s decisions.

In the following the hotspot identification protocol as an already existing concept
will be explained with its functionalities and privacy requirements (Raghunathan et al.,
2012).
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PRIVACY PROTECTION CONCEPT FOR THE HOTSPOT IDENTIFACION
PROTOCOL

Protocol overview
One approach for decreasing the data complexity is to reduce the amount of
combined statements for simple interpretations. A more extreme approach regarding
decreasing the amount of complexity can be found by looking at voting protocols.
These protocols are dealing with rather trivial but effective statements by sharing
quantity statements which as a consequence have no need for exchanging personal
data. Having clients exchanging information through a distribution server makes it
possible to filter location information so that individual identities are kept privately
(Raghunathan et al., 2012).
The fundamental idea of this approach is based on a distribution server relaying
between the clients. This way, identifying information (like e.g., location information
or identities) can be filtered so that each individual’s privacy is protected. Statements
based on quantities derived from location based occurrences, like a lot of people in
one spot, a lot of pictures taken in one spot, a lot of cars of one model or make in the
same area can allow for hotspot identification. A lot of people in one spot can identify
big events, a lot of pictures in one spot can identify points of interests (POIs) and a lot
of cars of the same model or make can be an indicator for an optimal workshop or
dealer position.
The architecture is divided into two communication protocols. The first is
designed as a registration protocol based on an authenticated channel (Fig.12).
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AUTHENTICATED CHANNEL

SERVER

CLIENTS
Registration Protocol
(serial, ID, password)
Voting Tokens
(token)
Figure 12: Hotspot identification registration protocol

Each client or automotive customer registers with an ongoing serial number to
expand the uniqueness entropy, branded with a time-stamp for validation purposes and
a corresponding ID and password. The reason for the registration phase is to equip
each client with a voting token that will allow for participation in several votes per
defined time period.
As already mentioned, the second is designed as voting protocol based on an
anonymous channel (Fig.13).

CLIENTS

ANONYMOUS CHANNEL
SERVER
(voting permit, location)
(voting permit, location)
Figure 13: Hotspot identification voting protocol

After every voting period the client would have to register again to renew the
voting permit. The re-vote feature is to guarantee up-to-date votes. A client’s vote in
this protocol provides a location statement including a position and auxiliary data like
further comments.
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The server, on the other hand, validates each vote and then only learns the
location, not who is at that particular location. In the next step the server defines socalled rounded hotspots, hotspot areas, wherein each vote increments a vote count
whose final tally will be published to all clients in the end. The total count is a
quantity statement and tells each client about current hotspots.
The defined privacy requirements and its related mechanisms that shall protect
each client’s privacy will be discussed in the next section.

Identified privacy protecting mechanisms in the protocol
The focus of privacy requirements shall be based again on the customer or client
perspective.
Privacy requirements from the client perspective:
1. Password and ID must be protected
2. Client ID must not be linked to submitted vote
3. Signatures must not link to the client’s ID
4. The precise location must not be revealed to the server

Accordingly

the

concept’s

requirements

respective

privacy

protection

mechanisms shall be explained and illustrated in example designs.
Requirement one can be satisfied with the following mechanism. It needs to allow
for a secret agreement and exchange of knowledge about the client’s ID and password
in order to guarantee authenticity (Pedersen, 1991). Common mechanisms to hide an
agreement or commitment are so-called commitment schemes (see Chapter 2). In the
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following an example design will be presented showing the functionality of the
scheme.
The sender is this scenario will be represented by client and the receiver by the
server. The client chooses a particular message m ∈ ℤP and a random r, with m
representing the bit code of the defined password and ID password and ID. For
computational ease a decimal setup in ℤ37 will be used.

← Commit

1. Step:

a. Server defines public directory
and
b. Sends public directory to client
c. Client computes commitment

d. Client sends

to server

← Open

2. Step:

a. Server computes (c),
with
b. Server verifies commitment with computed c and received c, that
is
Now server and client have agreed to hidden message (m) with a binding
commitment (c). As a consequence, only the client with the correct ID and password
will be eligible to vote. The client is now responsible to protect both from the public in
order to avoid misuse like manipulating entire voting phases.
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Requirement two can be satisfied with the following mechanism. So-called ZeroKnowledge-Proofs-of-Knowledge (ZKPoK) allows having a third party prove that a
statement is true. This other party will be completely convinced about the truth of the
statement, but will not learn anything about it. In other words, the third party will gain
zero knowledge (Barak, 2010).In this thesis the Schnorr’s ZKP will be applied
suggesting a proof of knowledge for the discrete logarithm, which will be explained in
the following with a number example.
This mechanism shall be used during the voting phase preventing the server from
being able to link a vote to a registered client. This shall be achieved by having the
client proving to the server that he knows his ID and password without revealing it.

Recollecting the setup from the previous parameters:




Commitment parameters
o

Multiplicative group: ℤ , with

o

Message:

o

Commitment:

o

Randomness:

o

Secret key:

o

Generator:

o

Public parameter:

Proof parameters: randomness:
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being prime

Identification protocol:

1. Step: Client computes
a.
b.
c. Sends

to server

2. Step: Server chooses random
a. With
b. Sends

from ℤ
to client

3. Step: Client computes
a.

b.

c. Sends

to server

4. Step: Server verifies
a.

Now Server has proof of the fact that the voting client has knowledge about his
ID and password and therefore is a registered participant. At the same time the server
did not learn anything about the ID and password so there is no chance that he can link
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the collected hotspot vote to a specific client. In other words location privacy is
provided.
Requirement three can be satisfied with the following mechanism. So-called blind
signature schemes (BSS) allow for approving certain content achieved by a third party
without exposing any information about the content itself (see Chapter 2). The content
here is represented through the client’s ID and password during the registration and
voting phase and therefore must not be exposed to the server in order to prevent any
linking to the client’s ID.
In the following an example design will be presented showing the functionality of
the scheme in ℤ161.
1. Step: Server defines public directory and sends it to the client
a. Server defines public directory

, with

and public modulo

as public key

,

and
–

and
b. Computes secret key

–
(in mod 132), (Tab.7)

with (e) relatively prime to φ(n), as
c. Sends public directory to client
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is true.

Table 8: Multiplicative inverse of (d) in ℤ132

φ (n)

e

B1

B2

q

r

132

35

0

1

3

27

35

27

1

-3

1

8

27

8

-3

4

3

3

8

3

4

-15

2

2

3

2

-15

34

1

1

2

1

34

-49

2

0

2. Step: Client computes blinded message and sends it to the server
a. Client defines message

and random unit

b. Client Computes blinded message
(in mod 161)
c. Sends

to the server

 The server cannot derive any useful information from (BM)
3. Step: Server signs blinded message and sends it back to the client
a. Signs the blinded message by computing
→
→
→
→

(in mod 161)

b. Sends (BMS = 54) back to client
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4. Step: Client extracts signed message
a. Client Computes
, with
(Tab.8)
b. Obtains the true blind signature to the message

,

c. Prove:
Table 9: Multiplicative inverse of (r) in ℤ161

n

r

B1

B2

q

r

161

3

0

1
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2

3

2

1

-53

1

1

2

1

-53

54

2

0

Requirement four can be satisfied with the following straight-forward security
proof. It shall be shown that location privacy requirement is satisfied and therefore the
server has no knowledge about the exact location of the client.
The following assumptions and definitions are fundamental to show that location
privacy is present:
It needs to be assumed that the client only transmits location and auxiliary data to
the server, such that the auxiliary data as additional location information. It is required
that the auxiliary data provided by the client shall not reveal any information about the
client’s ID. The definition IND-LP Raghunathan et al. are giving states that the ability
to distinguish between two location data sets D0 and D1 must be negligible. For the
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full system proof, the same indistinguishability needs to apply not only for the
aggregated location information, but also for the auxiliary information.
Further Raghunathan et al. define two datasets D0 and D1 as neighbors if there
exists two tuples in D0(ID,loc) and (ID’, loc’) such that upon swapping only the ID’s
D0 becomes D1. Further they define view (location information (D), private location
hotspot protocol (PrivLHS)) as PrivLHS executed over location information D,
returning the entire transcript of all interactions between the server and the client. As
D0 and D1∈ D are neighbors, both produce the same aggregated information. In order
to satisfy the location privacy requirement, all neighboring datasets D0, D1,
view(D0,PrivLHS)

and

view(D1,PrivLHS)

must

be

(computationally)

indistinguishable.
Informal proof. Raghunathan et al. go on and define intermediate datasets I0 = D0,
I1,…,In-1, In = D1, with Ij and Ij+1 being neighbors with n denoting the number of clients.
With the introduction of intermediate datasets and the prior defined neighbor
definition, a neighbor relation can be identified between e.g. I1 and D0. Given an
increasing order of ID one can say that after swapping neighboring IDs e.g. the D0
entry matches D1. From the beginning of the proof, where Ij and Ij+1 being defined as
neighbors, it follows that transcript of all interactions view (Ij,PrivLHS) ≈ view
(Ij+1,PrivLHS). Subsequently the standard hybrid argument shows that view
(D0,PrivLHS) ≈ view (D1,PrivLHS) which completes the proof of location privacy (the
full proof - Raghunathan et al., 2012).
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CHAPTER 5 – IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter shall first give an overview on the concept implementation including
the major software components. Second, it will illustrate the data translation starting
from the vehicle source passed on to the back-end for further processing. In order
protect the intellectual property of the Volkswagen Group the following
implementations shall only be described in its fundamentals.

IMPLEMENTING THE PRESENTED FRAMEWORK

This section will give an overview on the concept implementation including the
major software components (Fig.14).
Client
Collecting Application

Vehicle
Data

Server Back-end
Distributing Application

RESTLET
Server
Resource

Inbound
root

KAFKA
Consumer
Application
KAFKA
Server
KAFKA
Consumer
Application

Figure 14: Software overview of the implemented framework
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In the first step a Volkswagen proprietary software product called Exlap extracts
the sensor and other data from the in-vehicle communication. Exlap then sends this
data via HTTP to the back-end server. Exlap is a domain specific protocol to transport
vehicle specific data (e.g. sensor information, state information) in a non-binary
format over the "wire" to other devices and domains. The Exlap protocol suite also
defines the specific bindings for different transport layers, namely Bluetooth, TCP/IP
(WLAN) and representation via the HTTP protocol. Exlap is primarily aimed to
provide a generic, uniform and universal access based on the requirements and
restrictions of today’s and tomorrows (mobile information) devices and their
underlying platforms, e.g. Java/JavaScript in web browser environments. Exlap relies
on the use of existing standards (i.e. XML, UTF-8 encoding) to not “reinvent the
wheel” and encourage the simple processing of the transported data by leveraging the
native XML processing capabilities of today’s platforms (Fricke et al., 2009).
The following detail has been left out of the figure (Fig.14) above since it does
not have any impact on the functionality of the architecture but shall be mentioned for
the sake of completeness. In this implementation, as a temporary solution, the
extracted live vehicle data in XML format is first sent to the Volkswagen back-end in
Germany to be preprocessed before it is sent back to Volkswagen ERL back-end in
Californian. The communication between Germany and California is based on HTTP.
For the implementation, the RESTlet architecture shall be used. REST
(Representational State Transfer) is used for distributed systems such as the World
Wide Web. It makes use of HTTP client connectors representing a software element
that enables the communication between components (Fig.15). So called RESTful
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architectures are based on client server relationships, such that a client sends a request
to a server that will process the request and then send back a response (Fig.15).

Figure 15: RESTlet client-server architecture (Restlet, 2013)

The smaller boxes shall represent the connector enabling the communication
between components which are embodied by the larger boxes. The links denote the
various communication protocols (HTTP, SMTP, etc.) that can be used. There are two
very important characteristics. First, a client can have several resources to fulfill
different tasks (Fig.15). Second, every resource can act as client or server, such that
the data requested by one server can be made available to others (Fig.15). As the
architecture name already indicates the communication is based representations of
resources that are communicated between client and server. The representation of a
resource is realized in the form of a document describing the current state of a
resource (Restlet, 2013).
Once the current XML representation of the collected raw live data from the
vehicle is received via HTTP POST on the ERL back-end side, it will be parsed into
the slimmer JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) format. JSON is built on two
structures, the collection of name/value pairs and an ordered list of values (Json,
2013). The JSON API represents a hierarchical structure (Fig.16). The two types
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applying for this implementation are JSON Objects and JSON Primitives together
describing a two dimensional relation. The available data are either represented by an
immediate JSON primitive (name/value pairs, e.g. engineSpeed/0), or a JSON object
with the name of a sensor group (e.g. heating) and a value representing several sensors
in the form of name/value pairs (e.g. seatHeating/value, windowHeating/value, etc.).
JSON
Element
JSON
Object
Name String
Value JSON
Element

JSON
Array
List of
JSON
Elements

JSON
Primitive
Name String
Value String

Figure 16: Hierarchal representation of the JSON API

After the explicit vehicle data are extracted they shall be fed into a
Publish/Subscribe protocol, where data are made available for interested subscribers.
This implementation uses the Kafka platform as messaging system that was initially
developed at LinkedIn and is now used by multiple companies for all kinds of data
pipeline and messaging (Kafka, 2013). In general, publish subscribe mechanisms
introduce an extended communication infrastructure by i.e. adding topics and
providing listening applications with subscribing capabilities (MSDN, 2013).
The task of publishing data in the form of a message that is linked to a topic is
performed by a so-called producer. Consumers subscribe to a topic and accordingly
receive every message that is published under it. The distribution of messages happens
in such a way that each consumer process has its consumer group and each message is
delivered to precisely one process within a group. This allows for two options. First,
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various processes or machines can logically perform as a single consumer (queue
semantic). On the other hand, in order to have every consumer receive the same
published message, each of them needs to be in its own group (topic semantic).
Eventually, Kafka has one more benefit regarding large data that regardless ofthe
amount of consumers per topic, every message is stored just one time (Kakfa, 2013).
What this means physically is described by the following. There are three parties,
the producer and consumer as already mentioned and the distribution server. On the
server there are two components implemented, the Kafka-Server itself and the
“Zookeeper.” The Kafka-Server acts as broker (usually another machine) in that those
messages are physically sent to a server acting as a broker. The broker is caching the
data that are pushed from the producer and then pulled from the subscriber when ready
to consume (Fig.17).
pull

SERVER

push

BROKER
CONSUMER
register

PRODUCER
ZOOKEEPER

register

Figure 17: Physical communication in Kafka

Producer and consumer can be started dynamically anytime. The Zookeeper
coordinates producer and consumer, in terms of meta-data registration (e.g. available
topics, flow control, etc.) by each broker (Kafka, 2013).
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SENDING SAMPLE IS SENT FROM THE VEHICLE TO THE BACKEND

This section will illustrate the data translation starting from the vehicle source
passed on to the VW ERL back-end for further processing (Fig.18).
CaTe
---------------------------Vehicle Data
CAN
Messages
(XML-FORMAT)
---------------------State of Charge
User profiles:
(driving behavior)
Current data:
(A/C, speed, light)
…

fed
into

CAN
Packages
(JSON-FORMAT)
----------------------Defined groups
(ECU based, function
based)

fed into

Back-End
---------------------------Server
RESTlet
(HTTP-Interface)
------------------State of Charge
User profiles:
(driving behavior)
Current data:
(A/C, speed,
light)
…

fed
into

KAFKA
(Distribution Protocol)
----------------------Defined groups
(ECU based, function
group based

Independent Application
----------------------------------Requesting Vehicle Data

subscribe

Figure 18: Data translation overview
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publish

According to the overview, the major parts of the implementation will now be
presented and explained. The code is written in the language Java 1.7 using the
following non-standard public APIs (Tab.9):
Table 10: API documentation overview

API-Name
Org.json-20090211.jar

Documentation
www.json.org

Org.restlet.ext.servlet.jar
www.restlet.org
Org.restlet.jar
Scala-library-2.8.0.jar

http://www.scala-lang.org/

Gson-2.2.2.jar

http://code.google.com/p/google-gson/

Kafka-0.7.1.jar

http://kafka.apache.org/
http://people.apache.org/~mmorel/apache-

Zkclient-0.1.jar
s4-0.5.0-incubating-doc/javadoc/
Zookeeper-3.4.0.jar
Log4j-1.2.15.jar
Slf4j-1.7.0.jar

http://zookeeper.apache.org/
http://logging.apache.org/log4j/1.2/
http://www.slf4j.org/

At first the recorded vehicle data needs to be translated into Java objects, which is
mainly achieved by the following lines of code. The notation (…) indicates missing
code representing internal setups and knowledge and therefore shall remain
intellectual property of Volkswagen. Further class headers shall not be included in
order to maintain readability.
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This first class represents a Restlet client sending the extracted live-data to the
back-end server.
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In the next step the Server Application class accepts the request and routes it to
corresponding Server Resource class.

Now the vehicle data will be handed over to the Kafka Server class that functions
as interface between the HTTP-Post resource and the Kafka server running the Kafka
producer class
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The following producer class is responsible for the explicit vehicle data extraction
that is available for each available sensor group. The data extraction is indicated as
“Parser” and shall remain intellectual property of Volkswagen.
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As a final step a consumer thread will be started below.

The consumer class is now sending out the data request related to a consumer
group and including a topic representing the required sensor signal.
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CHAPTER 6 – EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

This describes the test setup for the framework implementation, as well as the
already mentioned Golden Rules in order to evaluate the privacy concept in the
subsequent chapter.
IMPLEMENTATION TEST CASES

Test cases for the framework have been defined based on standard black-box and
white-box tests, looking at inputs and outputs, and whether the internal data
processing operates as required. The system has been tested with two types of sensor
data, a common gas vehicle and an electric vehicle (EV). The test data provided in this
section is based on the EV data. The source data available comprises roughly 140
sensor data groups with sub-sensors ranging from 2-130. For the following test
scenario the available sub-sensors range from 0-3, which also considers empty groups.
The conceptual overview of the system below illustrates the inputs and outputs as well
the data translation inside the system (Fig.19).
SYSTEM
INPUT
AVAILABLE
SENSOR
DATA

PROCESSING
OF
TIME-BASED
UPDATE
PACKAGES
Figure 19: Conceptual system overview
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OUTPUT
EXPLICIT
SENSOR
GROUPS

In the following test cases are defined based on standard black-box and white-box
criteria. These cases shall be used in the evaluation to test the final implementation of
the presented framework.
This first table defines the specific test cases including name, testing method, and
brief description (Tab.10).

Table 11: Defined Test Cases

Name
Data set

Method

Description

Creating outputs allowing to compare Checks for the correct format of
the original XML file (extracted the testing data defining the
vehicle data) with newly created vehicles update set.
JSON file by comparing elements Successful,
randomly

Update

if

JSON

elements

match XML elements.

Creating an output that indicates a Verifies that the update has been
successfully

received

update

set received correctly.

including a comparison of data that Successful, if sent elements match
was sent with the data that has been received elements and prompt
received
Producer

indicates update received.

Creating an output of the extracted Verifies that the producer has
elements that shall be made available extracted

the

vehicle

data

and compare them with the original correctly from the update set.
elements from the source file

Successful, if extracted elements
match original elements.
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Consumer

Creating an output that shows the Verifies that the subscriber has
subscription which can be validated in received the vehicle correctly
two steps. First, the requested data from the publisher/producer.
need to match the topic that has been Successful, if subscribed topic
subscribed to. Second, compare the matches the prompt indicating the
received data with the original file in received data. And the received
order to approve the data correctness.

value of the data element matches
the value from the original file.

This second defines the specific inputs and expected outputs corresponding to the
test cases (Tab.11).
Table 12: Defined Inputs and Outputs

Name

Input

Expected Output

Data set

XML file

JSON file

Update

JSON file

JSON file, reception approval

Producer

JSON file

Extracted vehicle data

Subscriber

Consumer ID, group ID,

Vehicle data corresponding to topic,

subscribed topic

with time stamp of creation
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GOLDEN RULES

As part of the Federal Data Protection Act the so called “Golden rules” are
mounted into the German, British and most other European countries federal laws.
The act focuses on the protection against misuse of personal data in terms of data
processing. The definition can e.g. be found as annex to section 9 in the German
“Federal Data Protection Act”, which is related to technical and organizational
measures and therefore fundamental policy for big companies, like Volkswagen
dealing with various amounts of data.

The following stated 10 paragraphs are extracted from the German “Federal Data
Protection Act”, German orig.: “Bundesdatenschutzgesetz”.
“Where personal data are processed automatically, measures suited to the type of
personal data to be protected shall be taken
1. to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access to data processing
systems with which personal data are processed (access control),
2. to prevent storage media from being read, copied, modified or removed
without, authorization (storage media control),
3. to prevent unauthorized input into the memory and the unauthorized
examination, modification or erasure of stored personal data (memory
control),
4. to prevent data processing systems from being used by unauthorized
persons with the aid of data transmission facilities (user control),
5. to ensure that persons entitled to use a data processing system have access
only to the data to which they have a right of access (access control),
6. to ensure that it is possible to check and establish to which bodies personal
data can be communicated by means of data transmission facilities
(communication control)
7. to ensure that it is possible to check and establish which personal data
have been input into data processing systems by whom and at what time
(input control),
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8. to ensure that, in the case of commissioned processing of personal data,
the data are processed strictly in accordance with the instructions of the
principal (job control) ,
9. to prevent data from being read, copied, modified or erased without
authorization during the transmission of personal data or the transport of
storage media (transfer control),
10. to arrange the internal organization of authorities or enterprises in such a
way that it meets the specific requirements of data protection
(organizational control).” (BDSG, 1990)
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CHAPTER 7 – EVALUATION

In this chapter it will be evaluated whether the applied privacy mechanisms for
the various concepts are satisfying the data protection requirements stated by the
Golden Rules (Chapter 2 and 6). Further a brief summary of the back-box and whitebox tests regarding the framework implementation shall be given. Eventually, it shall
be assessed, whether there is a trade-off between the usability of concept functionality
and the level of privacy protection.

TESTING THE COMMUNICATION

This section is based on the in Chapter 6 defined test cases regarding the main
concept (Tab.12). In the following the results of the implementation testing shall be
presented.
Table 13: Test cases including success criteria

Name

Success criteria

Data set

JSON elements match XML elements.

Update

If sent elements match received elements and prompt
indicates update received.

Producer

The extracted elements match original elements.

Consumer

The subscribed topic matches the prompt indicating the
received data. And the received value of the data element
matches the value from the original file.
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For the following test scenario the available sub-sensors range from 0-3, which
also considers empty groups. In order to differentiate easier between the different
formats, a brief syntax overview shall be provided.
In general The XML file can be identified by the <text>content</text> syntax,
whereas the JSON file can be identified by the “name”: {“name”: “value”} syntax.
Case 1: Data set
The following prompts show parts of the JSON file generated from the original
XML vehicle data below (Fig.20 & Fig.21).

Figure 20: JSON representation of the vehicle data

Figure 21: XML source of the vehicle data

Despite the different formats, both show the same data and values, which
indicates that the format conversion was done correctly.
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Case 2: Update
The following two prompts show parts of the received update (Fig.22 & Fig.23).

.

Figure 22: First part of the update

Figure 23: Second part of the update

The received data are identical to the data that were sent indicating a correct
transfer via HTTP-Post.
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Case 3: Producer
The following prompts indicate the extracted data from the parser included in the
NewProducer class. The top of the first prompt shows the timestamp. The bottom part
of the first prompt (Fig.24) and the second prompt (Fig.25) show the received HTTPPost data processed by the producer with the implemented JSON parser.

Figure 24: Timestamp and extracted vehicle data

Figure 25: Extracted vehicle data

As the two prompts (Fig.24 & Fig.25) show the same information as the original
vehicle data XML (XF), it indicates that the processing was done correctly.
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Case 4: Consumer
The following prompts show two different subscriptions of the same implemented
consumer (Fig.26 & Fig.27) including the subscription and the corresponding received
data.

Figure 26: First subscription

Figure 27: Second subscription

As both prompts (Fig.26 & Fig.27) show that the consumed data corresponds to
the subscribed signal group, it indicates the subscription process was done
successfully.
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DISCUSSING THE RESPONSIBILTY OF PRIVACY PROTECTION

As it was cited earlier in this thesis, the “Golden Rules” as part of the German
“Federal Data Protection Act” are focusing on the protection against misuse of
personal data in data processing. It is related to technical and organizational measures
and therefore fundamental policy for big OEMs (car manufacturers) like Volkswagen
dealing with various amounts of data.
The following tables and graphics will illustrate how the responsibility for
privacy protection or often referred to as data protection is divided throughout the
lifecycle of a product in an automotive environment. It shall become apparent that not
all responsibility relies on the concept but a significant amount of protection
mechanisms are dictated by law and therefore already implemented by other parties of
the protection process. While indicating what privacy mechanisms are already taken
care of by other parties like e.g. the OEM and the developer pending protection needs
covered by the concept shall be pointed out as well (Tab.13).

Table 14: Policies and Responsibilities

Policy section

Responsibility

1. Access control (unauthorized persons)

OEM, developer

2. Storage media control

Privacy concept

3. Media control

Privacy concept

4. User control

OEM, developer

5. Access control (access rights)

OEM
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6. Communication control

Privacy concept

7. Input control

Privacy concept

8. Job control

OEM, developer

9. Transfer control

Privacy concept

10. Organizational control

OEM

There are three major parties, the OEM (car manufacturer), the developer, and the
developed concept or later product. The process of data protection can be described as
a layered model (Fig.28).

Figure 28: Data protection responsibility breakdown

The outside layer is represented by the OEM covering tasks like access control,
communication controls and offering user and job controls. The developer in turn must
make use of these provided controls to keep data protected. In the last step, for the
concept and later product the developer must incorporate mainly input, transfer and
communication protection mechanisms but also make use of secure storage and
memory to protect information. The OEM in other words provides the secure
environment with right policies, security zones, secure login, and hardware and
software encryption for mobile devices (Tab.14, Tab.15). The developer has to make
sure that throughout the development phase and later on in the lifecycle the concept
implementation allows for data protection. General mechanisms are i.e. choosing
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passwords with high security level, using encrypted mobile devices that are accessible
to authorized persons only (Tab.14, Tab.15). Further the developer is responsible for
the integration of protection mechanisms into the concept and later product.
In the next section it shall be discussed whether the defined privacy requirements
agree with the consent of the Golden Rules policies.

PRIVACY PROTECTION MECHANISMS APPLIED TO THE MAIN AND THE
RELATED CONCEPTS

Fulfill the privacy protection mechanisms the required policies?
The concept and later product in this context shall be defined as an information
exchange system mostly based on software that interacts over mobile Internet
connections like e.g. UMTS communicating over powerful antennas covering most of
the automotive infrastructure. Therefore i.e. the communication and input controls
must be covered by the concept in terms of privacy profiles and auditing mechanisms
for transparency purposes (Tab.14). One can define the privacy concept again as a
multi-layered concept. The first layer is addressed by the profile preferences that are
making sure that only authorized requests are processed and only permitted data leave
the vehicle. The decision power clearly remains with the source. The next layer is
responsible for the transfer of personal data from the source to the service providing
OEM. Private data must be protected through ciphering and key management, making
sure that the access is limited again to authorized persons only (Tab.14). The secret
key agreement between client and OEM limits the data access additionally. Digital
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signatures eventually make sure that only authenticated is considered in order to
increase the trust between the parties.
Table 15: Policies and mechanisms regarding the new framework

Policy description (*)

Mechanisms applied to this policy

1. “to prevent unauthorized persons from

Policies, security zones, public-key

gaining access to data processing systems

infrastructure (PKI) access control,

with which personal data are processed

network access control, operating

(access control)”

system access control, secure logon
procedure, password security, session
time out detection, define user
responsibilities, offer hardware or
software encryption mobile devices (**)

2. “to prevent storage media from being

Data Encryption Standard, RSA Digital

read, copied, modified or removed without

Signature

authorization (storage media control)”
3. “to prevent unauthorized input into the

Data Encryption Standard, RSA Digital

memory and the unauthorized examination,

Signature

modification or erasure of stored personal
data (memory control)”
4. “to prevent data processing systems

Password security, user responsibilities,

from being used by unauthorized persons

use hardware or software encrypted

with the aid of data transmission facilities

mobile devices (**)

(user control)”
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5. “to ensure that persons entitled to use a

Public-key infrastructure (PKI) access

data processing system have access only to

control, secret key management, access

the data to which they have a right of

right profiles, access on a “need to

access (access control)”

know” basis (**)

6. “to ensure that it is possible to check

Privacy profile permissions, auditing

and establish to which bodies personal data

(**)

can be communicated by means of data
transmission facilities (communication
control)”
7. “to ensure that it is possible to check

Privacy profile permissions, auditing

and establish which personal data have

(**)

been input into data processing systems by
whom and at what time (input control)”
8. “to ensure that, in the case of

Authentication, authorization, auditing,

commissioned processing of personal data,

job responsibilities (must handle

the data are processed strictly in

information with care, must apply valid

accordance with the instructions of the

IT security regulations), “doing the right

principal (job control)”

thing” (**)

9. “to prevent data from being read,

Privacy profile permissions, Data

copied, modified or erased without

Encryption Standard, RSA Digital

authorization during the transmission of

Signature

personal data or the transport of storage
media (transfer control)”
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10. “to arrange the internal organization of

Responsibilities are defined within the

authorities or enterprises in such a way that

company, protective measures

it meets the specific requirements of data

instructed to employees, the information

protection (organizational control)”

and data security has an advising role
and needs to give approval in case of
possible exceptions (**)(***)

(*) (BDGS, 1994), (**)(Fröhlich, 2003-2010), (***)(Knerlein, 2002)

PRIVATE HOTSPOT IDENTIFICATION AS A DIFFERENT DATA
DISTRIBUTION CONCEPT

Fulfill the privacy protection mechanisms the defined policies?
As in the section before, the “Golden Rules” shall be utilized as a standardized
compilation of privacy requirements (Tab.15). As the hotspot identification protocol
describes a private interaction between client and OEM, such that no personal data are
revealed or stored, the emerging anonymous results therefore only need to be
authenticated. In order to prevent tampering with voting results, additional hotspot
information as defined by Raghunathan et al. as auxiliary data, shall be protected as
well. Accordingly the standard OEM data protection controls remain necessary
(Tab.15).
The private hotspot identification protocol describes an alternative data exchange
concept based upon a significantly reduced amount of exchanged information. One
can describe this concept as privacy protection in different stages. Again, it is mostly
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based on software that interacts over mobile Internet connections. Adjusted to the
different concept, the communication and input controls are covered by respectively
different data protection mechanisms. Besides the necessary auditing instrument for
transparency purposes, the concept comprises four main mechanisms.
In order to maintain location privacy, all personal information i.e. identification
(ID), password, and actual location are hidden or remain undistinguishable. This is
achieved through a commitment scheme that binds to an ID-password pair during the
registration phase, while hiding it during the voting phase in order to keep privacy
protected (see Chapter 2). It is in the responsibility of the individual to not reveal or to
even sell this pair to a third party. In case the individual decides to do so anyway, the
assumption is that the amount of tampered votes represents an obvious minority that
does not allow manipulating the overall voting result. During the voting phase the
protocol uses Blind Signatures in order to prevent a linking possibility between the
client’s signature and account information. This mechanism shall inhibit the
identification of a client by his digital signature and thereby enhance anonymity. The
third form of anonymity enhancement is achieved through a so called Zero Knowledge
Proof of Knowledge (ZKPoK) that is used also during the voting phase. It enables the
OEM to validate the clients’ votes with zero knowledge about the individual client’s
account information. In other words the incentive is that the OEM is able to
authenticate a client without knowing the actual identity. Additionally, based on the
informal proof given in Chapter 4, stating that due to the neighboring relation between
clients and the rounded location hotspot identification, the OEM cannot determine the
actual location of the client.
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Eventually, the decision power remains with the source once again. The client can
decide if and what to vote for while not revealing any personal information. Although
private data are not revealed, several mechanisms work on different stages all relying
on each other, it is still good practice to have multilayer security. In order to provide
multilayer security the protocol incorporates standard key management between client
and OEM limiting the access to protocol data. Digital signatures ultimately make sure
that only authenticated data are considered in order to increase the trust between the
parties.
Table 16: Policies and mechanisms regarding the hotspot protocol

Policy description (*)

Mechanisms applied to this policy

1. “to prevent unauthorized persons from

Policies, security zones, public-key

gaining access to data processing systems

infrastructure (PKI) access control,

with which personal data are processed

network access control, operating

(access control)”

system access control, secure logon
procedure, password security, session
time out detection, define user
responsibilities, offer hardware or
software encryption mobile devices (**)

2. “to prevent storage media from being

Commitment Scheme, Blind Signature

read, copied, modified or removed without

for registration data. Standard hardware

authorization (storage media control)”

or software encryption is sufficient to
protect voting results
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3. “to prevent unauthorized input into the

Commitment Scheme, Blind Signature

memory and the unauthorized examination,

Scheme during registration otherwise no

modification or erasure of stored personal

personal information is revealed

data (memory control)”
4. “to prevent data processing systems

Password security, user responsibilities,

from being used by unauthorized persons

use hardware or software encrypted

with the aid of data transmission facilities

mobile devices (**)

(user control)”
5. “to ensure that persons entitled to use a

Public-key infrastructure (PKI) access

data processing system have access only to

control, secret key management, access

the data to which they have a right of

right profiles, access on a “need to

access (access control)”

know” basis (**)

6. “to ensure that it is possible to check

Commitment Scheme (during

and establish to which bodies personal data

registration), auditing

can be communicated by means of data
transmission facilities (communication
control)”
7. “to ensure that it is possible to check

Only personal is registration data.

and establish which personal data have

During the actual voting no personal

been input into data processing systems by

data are revealed at any time

whom and at what time (input control)”
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8. “to ensure that, in the case of

Authentication, authorization, auditing,

commissioned processing of personal data,

job responsibilities (must handle

the data are processed strictly in

information with care, must apply valid

accordance with the instructions of the

IT security regulations), “doing the right

principal (job control)”

thing” (**)

9. “to prevent data from being read,

Commitment Scheme, Blind Signature

copied, modified or erased without

Scheme, Zero Knowledge Proof of

authorization during the transmission of

Knowledge - ZKPoK

personal data or the transport of storage
media (transfer control)”
10. “to arrange the internal organization of

Responsibilities are defined within the

authorities or enterprises in such a way that

company, protective measures

it meets the specific requirements of data

instructed to employees, the information

protection (organizational control)”

and data security has an advising role
and needs to give approval in case of
possible exceptions (**)(***)

(*) (BDGS, 1994), (**)(Fröhlich, 2003-2010), (***)(Knerlein, 2002)
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DERIVED DATA PRIVACY CLASSES

The data applications investigated in Chapter 2 have been evaluated according to
the data that are exchanged. During this privacy-based evaluation, three data
categories have been observed: 1) identifiable, 2) time/location based, and 3)
broadcast or independent. Table 5 in Chapter 2 presents the details of observed data
categories in various application types. The security classes listed below apply the
following four mechanisms, derived from the Golden Rules (Chapter 6).
1. Access control mechanisms and rights
2. Secured storage
3. Secured communication
4. Degree of relation to a specific individual
Table 17: Privacy level based on defined data categories

Privacy

Time/location based

Broadcasted data,

data

independent data

Identifiable data
Classes
Personal

Name, bank information,

Data

social security, insurance
information, address,
telephone number, vehicle
identification number,
account information,
license plate sensor data,
social data, profile data
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Personal

Timed position,

Related

driving data,

Data

traveled
destinations,
Recommendations
(routes, charging),
Profile data

Derivative

Preferences (routes,

Data

driving style,
charging history,
news, sport and
music), social data

Unrelated

Unrelated sensor

Data

data, car make,
model

The derived data privacy classes define the foundation for the profile
management (Tab.16). In general, the classification presented here can be used as
guidelines when designing privacy protection mechanisms for the existing and the
applications to be.
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CHAPTER 8 – RELATED WORK

This chapter will give an overview of the previous attempts to improve privacy
protection, as well as introduce currently discussed legal issues.

PRIVACY PROTECTION THROUGH ANONYMITY

Wiedersheim et al. have demonstrated the possibility of reconstructing long traces
of a majority of vehicles within the same area. According to their work it is more than
questionable if location privacy is achievable in IVC systems against a powerful
adversary. Even though actual identities are replaced by pseudonyms and those also
change over time, once a target is identified based on its location every vehicle can be
tracked. Multi-hypothesis tracking (MHT) is largely recognized as the ideal
methodology to solve data association problems in present multiple target tracking
(MTT) systems (Blackman, 2004).
The general approach is based on multiple moving targets in a defined area while
their position is being sampled at random or periodic intervals. With measurements
comes noise and errors. For that reason most MHT systems are combined with filter
operations like the Kalman filter. The Kalman filter makes its decision based on the
current state, a prediction and a current measurement. The prediction results from
known movements of targeted object. The measurement is the outcome of measured
beacons (identification messages). The iterative process of prediction is used to
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estimate the next position of a vehicle within context of multi hypothesis tracking
(Fig.29).
Derived from
transition matrix

State estimation

State prediction

Current
measurement

Next
iteration
Kalman Gain

Adjustment based on
measurement and
noise

Estimation of
new state

Measurement and
recent prediction

Figure 29: Kalman iterations

In general for each measurement (marked as dots, see Fig.30) one hypothesis
shall be created.
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Figure 30: Kalman based muli hypothesis tracking (Wiedersheim et al., 2010)

Predictions are rated with higher probabilities, when they are close to
measurements. A hypothesis is defined as one potential track based on a set of
measurements. The most likely track is generated from multiple hypotheses.
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Eventually the authors show in their evaluation how identities become negligible
with traceability. The approach follows the idea of reducing the communication
density in terms of adjusting the beaconing (identification messages) intervals
(Fig.31).

Me
an
tra
cki
ng
dur
ati
on

Number of vehicles
Figure 31: Variation of beaconing intervals (Wiedersheim et al., 2010)

As the graph indicates with a density of 100 vehicles and a beacon interval of 1s
or shorter, every vehicle can be tracked for about

. It seems

obvious that decreasing the beaconing rate can be tool to reduce the traceability.
Unfortunately

is commonly discussed in standardization activities to

guarantee reliable communication (Schoch et al., 2006). In a second step the authors
look into adjusting the pseudonym changing intervals, with the result of necessary
pseudonym changing intervals significantly than shorter 30sec. These rates are
considered high rates and cause a substantial decrease in performance (Schoch et al.,
2006). In other words, both adjustments to enhance privacy are not practical.
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PRIVACY PROFILE MANAGEMENT

Some years ago IBM developed a concept called MyPrivacy Component
Architecture (Fig.32). It represents a complete concept presenting a flexible and
transparent privacy protection profile that was considered for Internet use only (Bohrer
et al., 2001).

Figure 32: IBM MyPrivacy Component Architecture (Bohrer et al., 2001)

The several components of this architecture shall protect private data. The main
functionalities provided by this architecture are profile and policy/rule management
accompanied by the authorization engine, as well as the profile responder and profile
updater. The primary task of both management components is profile and policy
maintenance of the system. The engine shall handle data requests based on the defined
policies. The profile responder adds personal privacy statement according to the
profile. The profile updater allows for modification within the profile. In case of more
complex requests a smaller portion of the requests can be handled manually by the
manual components. For more protection the interaction history agent intervenes in
case certain actions must be intercepted.
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The general idea shall not only be to protect private data but also provide more
transparency and scalability when it comes to exposing private data. Instead of
agreeing to general business terms specific requests shall be visible in order to
understand the purpose and action of the provided services. Since a lot of services out
on the market come with reasonable data requests and very useful everyday amenities
it should be up to the client to differentiate. The decision shall be service-wise by
setting different privacy rules based on the various services (e.g. dealer profiles,
workshop profile, tolling system profile).
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LATEST PRIVACY DISCUSSIONS

This section will give an abstract on the privacy concerns that are currently
discussed in public and in general between the US and EU governments.

The right to be forgotten
The current EU privacy debate seeks to enhance the privacy of its citizen. The
declared goal is to strengthen the data protection laws for the web, which is getting
slammed by large Internet firms and lobbyists. What happened was that the European
Commissioner for Justice Viviane Reding presented a draft (Reding draft) regarding a
revised data protection regulation early 2012 as an adjustment to the Internet age. The
right for privacy often referred to as “the right to be forgotten” shall arise again to
protect the consumers’ personal data. The main parties involved in this debate are
companies, civil rights proponents and data protection officials in the EU member
states. The biggest challenge in data protection is the outcome of the connected world
enabling various data combinations. The mainly agreed upon approach is that personal
data can be obtained by firms and applications, if they have obtained the consent of
the user. The Reding draft specifically states, “the legitimate interests pursued by” the
entity that processes the data may make consent unnecessary, as long as such interests
are not “overridden by the interests or fundamental right and freedoms of the data
subject”. In other words, in case the individual representing the “data subject” must be
given the opportunity to deny the processing of the data.
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Current privacy cases regarding traveling safety
In the last days of 2012 the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
proposed regulations asking car manufacturers to build event data recorders also
known as "black boxes" into all new cars and light trucks (Lowy, J., 2012). The
proposal seems far behind since automakers have already been quietly integrating the
devices, which are automatically recording the actions of drivers and the responses of
their vehicles in a continuous information loop, into most new cars for years. One of
the purposes is in case a vehicle is involved in a crash or when its airbags deploy,
inputs from the vehicle's sensors within the 5 to 10 seconds before impact are
automatically preserved. Within current discussions privacy advocates claim that
government regulators and automakers are distributing an intrusive technology
without having any policy in place that prevents abuse of the collected data. Some
manufacturers already are collecting such data. According to the associate director of
the Electronic Privacy Information Center there are no rules or limits, no
consequences and there is no transparency. One major concern is that the growing
computerization of vehicles and transmission of data to and from vehicles might lead
to illegal uses of recorder data.
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Current privacy cases regarding social media and connected applications
Social media platforms as they are already implemented into the latest in-vehicle
media systems have grown into a major business for all kinds of data trading.
Platforms like Facebook are known to make their money by selling their website space
and other available data to different companies. Therefore it is not surprising that
Facebook is constantly fighting against claims that could compromise this business.
One of the current claims is comes from one of the German privacy regulators
referring to the fact that Facebook denies the use of pseudonyms. Facebook is
officially claiming that the main purpose of the requirement is to keep the website
secure (Spiegel-WireReports, 2013).
In the past year it has been detected that Apple and other companies have been
transferring their users’ calendars from their phones to company servers. The outcome
of this controversy had the upside that Apple was forced to change its practices and
required apps in its store to ask for permission first, before tapping into address books.
California Attorney General Kamala Harris achieved an agreement with Amazon,
Apple, Google, Microsoft and others aligning the mobile app industry with existing
California law. One of the major requirements asks online services that collect
personal data to visibly post a privacy rule. On the downside again, by the end of last
year the Senate approved an act that reauthorizes the country’s warrantless
wiretapping program through 2017. It allows the government to electronically spy on
citizens’ communications with nearly no control until one of the involved parties is
believed to be outside the United States. Proposed amendments are demanding for
more transparency (San Francisco Chronicle, 2012).
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSION

As Bohrer et al. put it appropriately, the question is not anymore “to give or not to
give” personal data, since in the modern world there is no way to live outside the
digital or connected world. Everybody has private data stored somewhere at some
company or institution. Accordingly, the new question must be “how to deal with the
given data and how to control the personal data in the future”, as it now has become a
problem of business and society.
Most Internet and smart phone users are already experiencing privacy no longer
just as a footnote. It is written in big letters, in order to be transparent and thereby gain
the trust of the user, who is perhaps using a smart phone app or an online service. The
implementation described in this thesis has shown that the connected world we know
from the Internet and smart phones has already reached the automobile. People enjoy
the benefits of the Internet, like shopping without necessarily leaving the house.
Hence, it is perhaps obvious that people would enjoy similar benefits in their vehicle.
A vehicle offering general location information, like points of interests (POIs) with
just one scroll move, have already been established in the connected automotive
world. Extending this approach by offering personalized route or other
recommendations or online diagnosis for your vehicle without the need of seeing a
mechanic upfront will bring the same benefits into the automotive world.
The other perspective on this topic is the view of the OEM. In times, where data
are flowing constantly, customers become anxious about what is going to happen with
their personal data. The origin of this concern comes in most cases of human history
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from a lack of the understanding due to the data complexity. Successful companies
these days have discovered exactly this, that in order to gain the customer’s trust,
comprehensible privacy terms are extremely important. The IBM-MyPrivacy
Component Architecture was implemented for the traditional Internet usage. Instead of
just accepting the terms of conditions of a service, this approach makes sure that the
requested information agrees with the terms defined by the user itself. In other words,
the service cannot request more data than the user allows, as the negotiation example
in Chapter 4 has demonstrated. This thesis has shown how this profile management
concept can also be applied to the connected automotive world and what indication it
has for privacy protection. Possible future work could discuss whether the user
identification should be managed individually by the service providers or by a central
instance, similar to latest Google+ approach.
The discussion on privacy responsibilities has revealed how factors like secured
communication, secured storage, access control and related rights are divided among
the developing entities involved. The data analysis over the most common automotive
and related connected applications has been summarized in new data categories
representing the new data complexity. Building on these categories, a new generation
of automotive data security classes has been defined, which shall serve as a basis for
the adopted privacy profile management. One of features of the privacy management
system is flexibility, which has been proven to be important, by demonstrating how
data complexity and thereby privacy requirements vary with the service.
Overall, it became apparent that the answer to the question of how to control the
data is transparency. As people enjoy the benefits of communicating vehicles
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(UIEvolution, 2012), it is important to distinguish between the various data provided
by the user and define a profile management that acts accordingly.
In contrast, Raghunathan et al. have introduced an approach attacking the
challenge of keeping location privacy protected, while practicing location-data mining
operations. The proposed system identifies location hotspots (like events or other
sights), without learning who is present in particular. As a second feature, the paper
introduces a recommendation service building on the hotspot detection.
This approach is clearly a step forward in terms of only sharing what is important,
while hiding what has no immediate impact on the subject (e.g. personal data). On the
other hand, the reason why this is feasible is that the overall message resulting from
the protocol is a “quantity statement”. Consequently, this makes the inclusion of e.g.
personal data, negligible. In the automotive context, quantity statements can be used in
several contexts like sight-seeing, limited diagnosis aspects, aftermarket support, or
marketing. Overall, this protocol is applicable to every service, where the only key
aspect is the location itself and no personalized service is required.
Eventually, current reports have shown how several manufacturers have already
been collecting data without the knowledge and/or consent of the customer. Major
privacy concerns result from the growing computerization of vehicles and
transmission of data to and from vehicles. The fact that no rules, limits nor
consequences have yet been determined demands immediate action improving the
overall transparency, as presented in this thesis.
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